Substitution box (S-box) is a vital nonlinear component for the security of cryptographic schemes. In this paper, a new technique which involves coset diagrams for the action of a quotient of the modular group on the projective line over the nite eld is proposed for construction of an S-box. It is constructed by selecting vertices of the coset diagram in a special manner. A useful transformation involving Fibonacci sequence is also used in selecting the vertices of the coset diagram. Finally, all the analyses to examine the security strength are performed. e outcomes of the analyses are encouraging and show that the generated S-box is highly secure.
Introduction
With rapid advancement in communication technology, the maintenance of data security has become a great challenge for cryptographers. A number of useful encryption algorithms and techniques are created in interesting papers by Belazi et al. [1, 2] to ensure the safety of transmitted information. In this regard, block encryption algorithm plays an important role in modern cryptographic systems. e important component of block encryption algorithm is the substitution box (S-box). e S-box has been used in many cryptosystems including Data Encryption Standard (DES), International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). e security strength of the S-box determines the security strength of the entire cryptosystem. It is therefore established that the S-box is an important nonlinear component for the security of cryptographic schemes. e DES was proposed by a well-known computer production company in 1977, and the DES investigations drove the re nement in the cryptographic system enormously [3] . Later, a group of university students broke the DES security. is led to the realization that of some other secure and e cient encryption method has to be evolved. In 2002, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was created by Daemen and Rijmen, which is now the standard for the encryption [4] . e S-box has a vital role in quality of encryption. Utilization of a weak S-box is tantamount to compromising on the security of encryption process. erefore, before using an S-box in a cryptosystem, it is pertinent to assess its strength. e analyses for measuring strength include nonlinearity method (NL), linear approximation probability method (LAP), bit independence criterion (BIC), strict avalanche criterion (SAC), and di erential approximation probability method (DAP). Some studies related to the construction of S-box and its strength are in [5, 6] . e analyses of the S-box in image encryption based on majority logic criteria are investigated in [7, 8] . More investigation on the S-box based on a chaotic map is conducted in [9] , hyperchaotic system-based S-box in [10] , and chaotic neural network-based S-box in [11] . An e cient S-box is constructed in [12] by using a 2D Logistic-adjusted-Sine map, linear fractional transformation, and Gray code. Chen et al. described an S-box based on three-dimensional chaotic baker maps in [13] . Hayat and Azam [14] used elliptic curves to construct an S-box by considering the ordinate of the curve for this construction. e construction of an S-box by using the projective general linear group was investigated by Altaleb et al. in [15] . us, various aspects of construction of an S-box are investigated to get a secure and better S-box which enables better encryption. e techniques and methods for the generation of S-boxes presented in the literature are either suitable for the creation of static S-boxes or are very complicated and time consuming. Static S-boxes have their own limitations and weaknesses. ese S-boxes may help attackers in the cryptanalysis of the captured ciphertext, and hence they may reach the original plaintext. On the other hand, the methods presented in the literature that generate dynamic and keydependent S-boxes are entirely complex and inefficient. For example, recently, attackers have been successful in breaking the loops of AES. us, the need for an efficient method to generate dynamic S-boxes exists. e construction of an S-box using the first time group graphs is presented as an alternative S-box design technique. It exponentially improved security and efficacy which is vividly visible in subsequent work in this paper.
We propose an efficient technique for the construction of an S-box by using action of a quotient of PSL(2, Z) on PL(F 257 ). e permutations obtained in this way are used to draw a coset diagram. e vertices of the coset diagram are considered in a special way for constructing an S-box. e S-box generated in this way is highly secure, closely meeting the optimal values of the standard S-box. All the tests for the security strength are performed and compared with other S-boxes confirming that the proposed S-box is highly secure.
Preliminaries
e modular group PSL(2, Z) is the free product of two cyclic groups of orders 2 and 3. Its finite presentation is 〈x, y ; x 2 � y 3 � 1〉 [16] . It is the most studied group, and in the documentation for the award of Abel Prize in 2009, it is described as "one of the most important groups in the modern history of mathematics." Here, x and y are generators of the modular group. ese generators are linear fractional transformations defined as x(a) � (− 1/a) and y(a) � 1 − (1/a). By adjoining a new element t(a) � (1/a) with x and y, one obtains a presentation 〈x, y, t : x 2 � y 3 � t 2 � (xt) 2 � (yt) 2 � 1〉 of the extended modular group PGL(2, Z). Its existence is described in Lemma 2. Let q be a power of a prime p. en, by the projective line over the finite field F q , denoted by PL(F q ), we mean F q ∪ ∞ { }. Higman introduced a graph for the modular group PSL (2, Z) . It is well known now as a coset diagram for the modular group. e three cycles of y are represented by triangles whose vertices are permuted anticlockwise by y, and any two vertices which are interchanged by x are connected by an edge. e fixed points of x and y, if they exist, are denoted by heavy dots. For more details about coset diagrams, we suggest reading [17] [18] [19] .
Consider the action of the modular group on PL(F 13 ) � 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 
We apply x and y on each element of PL(F 13 ) to find permutation representation of x and y (see Table 1 ). Note that, if we apply x or y on any element of PL(F 13 ), normally a fraction is obtained. Since in F 13 , 0 ≡ 13, we continue to add 13 in the numerator so that an integral value is acquired.
In this way, we obtain the permutation representation of x and y as follows:
x � (0, ∞)(1, 12)(2, 6)(3, 4)(5)(7, 11)(8, )(9, 10), y � (0, ∞, 1)(2, 7, 12)(3, 5, 6)(4, )(8, 9, 11)(10).
(1)
Each cycle of length 3 is represented as a triangle, and each cycle of length 2 by an edge connecting vertices of the triangles, producing the following coset diagram. Here, 5, 8 are the fixed points of x and 4, 10 are the fixed points of y. e coset diagram evolved from the above permutations is shown in Figure 1 .
A group is called the triangle group if it can be presented as 〈x, y : x l � y m � (xy) n � 1〉 where l, m, n are the positive integers. It is denoted by Δ(l, m, n). e triangle groups Δ(2, 3, n) are particularly important as being one-relator quotients of PSL (2, Z) . e triangle groups Δ(2, 3, n) is finite if n ≤ 5. e symmetric groups S 3 , S 4 and alternating groups A 4 , A 5 are finite triangle groups of the form Δ(2, 3, n).
e purpose of this study is to establish a scheme for S-box construction by taking action of A 4 � 〈x, y; x 2 � y 3 � (xy) 3 � 1〉 on PL(F 257 ). In this construction, we also utilize the Fibonacci sequence as it is one of the most interesting, useful, and close to the real life. A flow chart of the proposed scheme is presented in Figure 2 
Parametrization
ere are several methods adopted by researchers for the construction of an S-box. Some cryptographers, while constructing an algebraic S-box, considered the action of a group on sets, real, or quadratic lines. But the use of coset diagrams is new in the literature. In the proposed scheme, we take action of A 4 on PL(F 257 ), then in the second step, we draw a coset diagram of the action, and finally we construct an S-box by using vertices of the coset diagram. e action of the modular group on PL(F p ) evolves a coset diagram in which each vertex is fixed by (xy) p . In Figure 1 , one can see that each vertex of the coset diagram is fixed by (xy) 13 . is coset diagram represents the homomorphic image of the group 〈x, y : x 2 � y 3 � (xy) 13 � 1〉. In order to draw a coset diagram for 〈x, y : x 2 � y 3 � (xy) n � 1〉, where n is of our own choice, there is a method given in [20] , known as parametrization method. It is expressed in the following way.
Lemma 1.
ere are just two conjugacy classes of nondegenerate homomorphism from PGL(2, Z) to PGL (2, q) in which x y is of order 2, and the two other in which x yt is of order 2. Lemma 2. Either x y is of order 6 or there exists an involution t in PGL(2, q) such that txt � t and tyt � (y) 2 . Step I
Step II
Step III
Coset diagram of the action
Step IV Proposed S-box 16x16 matrix is formed, then apply a permutation of S 256 under the correspondence which maps each class to its parameter.
For each nondegenerate homomorphism σ : PGL (2, Z) | PGL (2, q) , there exists an action of PGL(2, Z) on PL(F q ). For the generators x, y, and t, we suppose (x)σ � x, (y)σ � y, and (t)σ � t to have order 2, 3, and 2, respectively. If X and Y are matrices representing x and y, normalized by det(Y) � 1; then, by taking θ � (traceXY) 2 /det(XY), we can associate a parameter θ with the homomorphism σ. Assigning the parameter θ ∈ F q with σ is called parametrization. e canonical map GL(2, q) | PGL(2, q) associates a matrix M to hM ∈ PGL (2, q) , where h is a scalar. It can be seen that
is an invariant of hM. Here, θ will be an invariant if the characteristic equations of all the elements in a conjugacy class of M are the same. If in addition (XY) n � 1, then by eorem 1 there is a bijection between the elements in F q and the conjugacy class of σ. Specifically, there is a polynomial g n (θ) such that corresponding to each root θ of g n (θ), a triplet x, y, t ∈ PGL(2, q) can be obtained. Lemma 1, 2, and 3 guarantee the presentation of the triangle groups
If X, Y, and T indicate elements of GL(2, q) corresponding to the elements x, y, and t in PGL (2, q) then by this and the fact that x, y, and t are of orders 2, 3, and 2, respectively, the matrices X, Y, and T are
For the conjugacy class of xy, consider the characteristic equations of the matrices X, Y, and XY, which are
Ultimately, by using the values of r, s, d, f, and k in the abovementioned equations, the values of the entries of matrices X, Y, and T are
Action of A 4 on Projective Line over the Finite Field
PL(F 257 ). e action of A 4 on the projective line over the finite field PL(F 257 ) is defined by the map
e linear fractional transformations of the generators x and y of A 4 act on each element of PL(F 257 ) producing the following permutations of x and y:
x: (055 000)( 157 001)(019 002)(183 003)(004 020)(192 005)(006 150)(007 096)(008 024)(009 026)(029 010) (034 011)(012 044)(013 074)(014 inf )(211 015)(016 241)(251 017)(018 256)(021 189)(022 135)(023 093) (025 102)(027 128)(028 230)(203 030)(207 031)(032 182)(092 033)(035 158)(036 058)(037 179)(140 038) (039 063)(071 040)(041 126)(122 042)(043 136)(153 045)(237 046)(047 129)(048 239)(049 049)(098 050) (051 061)(052 053)(141 054)(056 086)(057 168)(184 059)(060 225)(062 077)(064 167)(164 065)(066 171) (067 105)(068 070)(069 083)(072 075 
Coset Diagram of the Action.
e coset diagram for the action of A 4 on PL(F 257 ) consists of two types of the circuits, given below (Figures 3 and 4) : 
Construction of S-Box Using a Coset Diagram
After making the coset diagram, we proceed towards construction of the S-box from the coset diagram. ere are twenty-two circuits in the coset diagram, so the first step is how to choose a circuit. e second step is the selection of vertices of that circuit in a specific manner. erefore, for the first part, instead of randomly choosing the circuits we choose the circuits by using a sequence, known as Fibonacci sequence 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, . . .. We define mapping as β : PL(F 257 ) | PL(F 257 ) by β(k) � Sum of the first k terms of the Fibonacci sequence. en, choose the circuit in which β(x) occurs. By this mapping, we can easily and systematically choose the circuits one by one. For illustration, β(0) � 0, we pick the circuit of the coset diagram having 0 as the vertex, that is, the circuit shown in Figure 5 . Similarly, for β(1) � 1, β(2) � 1 + 1 � 2, β(3) � 1 + 1 + 2 � 4, and so on. Secondly, after choosing the circuit of the coset diagram, now we select the vertices of that circuit in a special manner. We initiate from the vertex β(0) and apply xy, (xy) 2 , and (xy) 3 (because of the third relator of A 4 ) on β(0) and note the vertices, which are (0, 181, 14). en, in the same circuit we choose the smallest number from the remaining vertices of the circuit, which is 16, apply xy and its powers to get (16, ∞, 60). Continue the process by choosing the smallest from the remaining vertices of the circuit and apply xy and its powers so that all the vertices of the circuit are utilized. We can view all the entries of the circuit containing β(0) � 0 in the first row of Table 2 , except infinity. It is important to mention here that if β(x) appears in the previous circuit then it means it is already utilized so move on. But, if β(x) appears in the new circuit, then apply xy and its powers in the similar fashion and note the permutation. Continue the process till all the vertices of the coset diagram are exhausted yielding 258 entries in an order. Ignore ∞ and 256. us, a 16 × 16 S-box is constructed as shown in Table 2 . It is important to mention here that whenever β(x) > 256 take modulo class 257. It seems easy to find β(x) in modulo class 257 but this is not so. We had to use an online PowerMod Calculator for these calculations. e entire scheme of constructing an S-box is based on the action of a finite triangle group A 4 , coset diagram, and Fibonacci sequence. ese all inculcate the natural patterns in the scheme which gives a very suitable and effective S-box as a result.
For more variability, we apply one of the permutations from S 256 on the outcome presented in Table 2 to change the positions of the elements. is permutation increases the randomness of the elements and gives the proposed S-box with high nonlinearity, as shown in Table 3 
Analysis for Evaluating the Strength of S-Box
e criteria generally selected to test the S-box are nonlinearity, strict avalanche criteria, bit independence criteria, linear approximation probability, and differential approximation probability. For testing the strength of the proposed S-box, we discuss each of them in the following. We also compare the results with recently developed S-boxes.
Nonlinearity. Nonlinearity (NL)
is one of the significant criteria for the performance evaluation of the S-box which measures the randomness of the values of the S-box. e NL of proposed S-box is 110.50 which is higher than that of . e higher the NL, the stronger the S-box. Hence, the NL of the proposed S-box guarantees a secure communication. e NL of the proposed S-box is expressed in Table 4 and comparison with is in Table 7 .
Strict Avalanche Criteria.
e concept of strict avalanche criteria (SAC) was introduced by Webster and Tavares [45] which measures the confusion creation of an S-box by measuring the change in output bits due to the change in input bits. e minimum and the maximum value of SAC of the proposed S-box are 0.40625 and 0.578125, whereas the average value is 0.503175 (Table 5) which is much closer to 0.5, the ideal value of SAC. e lesser deviation from 0.5, the stronger the S-box. e comparison of SAC of the proposed S-box with that of is in Table 7 , which depicts that the proposed S-box has better SAC performance.
Bit Independence Criteria.
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Linear Approximation Probability.
Linear approximation probability (LAP) criteria measure the strength or resistance of the S-box against linear attacks. e smaller the LAP value, the higher the strength of security of the S-box. e LAP of the generated S-box is 0.0859375 which is smaller than that of . is depicts that the proposed scheme has ability to generate a strong, efficient, and attackresistant S-box.
Differential Approximation Probability.
Differential approximation probability (DAP) is a measure to analyse the resistance of the S-box against differential attacks. e smaller the DAP, the higher the resistance against attacks. e DAP of the generated S-box is 0.0234375 which is exceptionally good. is DAP value is near to the optimal value 0.0156. is reflects that the S-box generated by group action and using coset diagrams has the ability of high resistance against differential attacks. e comparison of NL, SAC, BIC, LAP, and DAP with other known S-boxes is given in Table 7 . e NL and the BIC value of the proposed S-box are higher than that of the others. e least values of LAP and DAP show the proposed S-box is highly resistive against the linear as well as differential attacks. And the confusion/diffusion creation criteria SAC is also closer to the standard value 0.5000. Hence, the perfect combination of all (NL, SAC, BIC, LAP, and DAP) shows the proposed S-box is a secure choice for encryption.
Majority Logic Criteria
Majority logic criteria measure image encryption strength of the S-box. Entropy, correlation, contrast, energy, and homogeneity are the components of MLC. We used JPEG image of a baboon for this analysis. .9832 is better than that of [4, 24, 26, 46, 47] . e entropy value is very close to the ideal value, which is 8. e values of contrast, correlation, energy, and homogeneity also indicate the proposed scheme provides a strong S-box which is suitable for encryption applications. e results of this analysis in comparison with well-known S-boxes are in Table 8 .
Application of Proposed S-Box in
Multimedia Security e generated S-box is also being applied for watermarking technique to determine its application in multimedia security. From the outcomes of the analyses (Table 9) , it can be seen that our S-box has the tendency to create confusion. Security and Communication Networks erefore, it meets the necessary requirements to be reliable in multimedia applications. In watermarking scheme, the watermark is first encrypted with the proposed S-box and then embedded into the host image.
is additional encryption would provide additional security as the inverse of S-box is required for the extraction of watermark. is will add more security to our scheme and will support copyrights protection. As frequency domain technique is more robust as compared to spatial domain, discrete cosine transform is used for watermarking technique and S-box-substituted watermark is embedded into the DCT-transformed host image (Figures 7-10 ). Table 7 shows the performance comparison of our S-box with other S-boxes based on the cryptographic properties. Our findings are as follows:
Results and Discussion
(1) A high value of nonlinearity provides resistance against linear cryptanalysis. e average nonlinearity of our S-box is superior to the rest of the S-boxes in Table 7 . is results in decent confusion, and makes the proposed S-box resilient against linear cryptanalysis. (2) e SAC value near 0.5 (the perfect value for SAC) is the ultimate goal of every S-box designer. Table 7 depicts that our SAC value (0.503) is very close to this perfect value. We can say that our S-box satisfies the SAC. (3) Similarly, the BIC value of our S-box is better than the BIC values of all other S-boxes in Table 7 . (4) Any S-box with a lesser value of DAP is more resilient against differential cryptanalysis. e DAP value of our S-box is 0.0234, which is better than the DAP values of other S-boxes in Table 7 . is value of DAP reflects the strength of our S-box. (5) To defy linear cryptanalysis, a smaller value of LAP for a given S-box is desired by S-box designers. e LAP value of our S-box is 0.086, better than all S-boxes developed in . Due to this small value, we can say that our S-box is resistant to linear cryptanalysis. (6) e JPEG image of the baboon is used for this MLC. e values of entropy, contrast, correlation, energy, and homogeneity show that our S-box is suitable for encryption applications.
Conclusions
An efficient scheme for the construction of an S-box is presented in this paper. e proposed S-box is constructed by taking action of a quotient of the modular group on the projective line over the finite field PL(F 257 ). e newly constructed S-box is applied for image encryption and watermarking schemes as well. e proposed S-box has high resistance against linear attacks as well as for differential attacks. e results of security strength measuring tests: NL, SAC, BIC, LAP, and DAP all are very close to ideal values.
is depicts that the proposed scheme is highly preferable for constructing an S-box for cryptographic applications.
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